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ERIC HIRSCH, Brunel University London
Anthropology and history are inseparable, sharing concerns with societies other than the one we currently inhabit—whether in
time or in space. This entry considers how the relation between anthropology and history developed since the late nineteenth
century when anthropology professionalised as a discipline. Initially, anthropology was wedded to a form of history that was
conjectural, based on hypothetical ideas of societal development deriving from evolution or diffusion. Thus, societies were often
held to progress over time, in ways comparable to biological evolution, or they were held to develop through adoption of
sociocultural traits from one or several culture centres. Criticism of this conjectural history came from within both anthropology
and history. For a period of several decades, then, anthropology had a relatively detached relation from history, but by the mid-
twentieth century this all changed. Anthropology was now understood as analogous to historiography—to writing history—as
both seek to understand another society or culture and translate it into terms of one’s present society. Later, the influences of
colonialism and global capitalism on the societies studied by anthropologists were given greater prominence, as was the issue of
understanding societies in historical time, i.e. as subject to change over time. However, the supremacy of historical knowledge
and historical time was subsequently questioned, as anthropologists asked whether all people should be seen to exist in a single
and secular historical time that encompasses other kinds of time. In contrast to the single frame of historical time, with its
radical separation of past and present, greater recognition is being given to the multifaceted temporal relationships of past,
present, and future as diverse peoples have distinct ways of valuing and communicating temporal categories and their
interconnections. Anthropology thus raises the question of whether everything can or should be historicised.
Introduction
Anthropology has a complex yet intimate relation with history; at times close, at other times more distant.
In understanding this relation, one can trace the theoretical and empirical interests that have shaped
anthropology, and one can learn about the tensions that mark the interplay of history and the social
sciences  more  broadly.  By  history,  reference  is  made  to  the  study  of  the  past  and  how,  through
understanding a particular past, one is able to account for specific changes in a given society. Mainstream
contemporary historical practice involves the study of archives and documents from a past time that
provide insights into social life at that time and how that social life has changed. Oral history is another
form, where accounts of the past are narrated by knowledgeable persons and these narratives are then
used as sources for understanding past  times and social  change.  Ethnohistory is  an interdisciplinary
approach to indigenous perceptions and understandings of the past drawing on anthropology, history, and
archaeology. There is also an older kind of historical practice known as ‘conjectural history’ which enabled
historians and anthropologists to speculate on the nature of historical events for which no documents or
material evidence existed.
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Anthropology’s relation with history has taken various forms and is discussed in the sections that follow.
What emerges is  a  series of  debates about the appropriate focus of  anthropological  study,  and how
dimensions of the past and its representation are to be incorporated into sociocultural analysis. Some of
the complexities of this relation are especially evident when one considers the first fifty years or so of
anthropology as a professional discipline. During that time, in the late nineteenth century, anthropology
was wedded to a kind of conjectural history which was subsequently displaced. By the beginning of the
twentieth century, an emphasis on societies in the present became established as anthropology’s focus.
However, this ‘presentism’ was subsequently criticised as it risked ignoring the influence of the past.
Anthropology and history came to be understood as inseparable. As the impact of a historical perspective
grew in anthropology, including the recognition of colonialism as an intrinsic part of that history, there
emerged a critique of the Western assumption regarding the separation of past and present and their
causal relations as the foundation of historical inquiry. This was perceived as a provincial, European notion
and one that had to be transcended. Parallel to this critique was one concerning the status of historical
knowledge: is history a superior form of knowledge, or is it just another form of myth? Finally, a hotly-
debated issue that arose was whether people around the world exist in a secular, historical time or whether
this view is Eurocentric and our ideas about history need to be rethought.
Conjectural history and its critique
When  anthropology  began  to  professionalise  in  the  late  nineteenth  century—discarding  its  amateur
status—it was heavily influenced by two ideas: evolution and diffusion. The form of evolution prominent in
anthropology was one according to which all societies progressed—‘evolved’—to a higher and improved
state. A group of anthropologists in Britain and the United States, namely John Lubbock, Henry Maine,
John M. McLennan, Lewis H. Morgan, and Edward B. Tylor created a coherent discourse about this
evolutionary progress. They held that societies evolved over time and that a direct advancement could be
determined  from  ‘primitive  society’  through  varied  intermediary  stages  to  ‘modern  society’.
Anthropologists, they claimed, were to study the ‘primitive societies’ seen to lie at the lower rung of this
hierarchy.
Diffusion in anthropology, by contrast, saw societies develop through contact, where borrowings of ideas,
techniques, and institutions ‘diffused’ between them. Versions of diffusionist ideas were developed by
figures such as Fritz Graebner in Germany and Clark Wissler in the United States while Grafton Elliot
Smith in Britain proposed an extreme version that isolated Egypt as the basis of all civilisations (see Kuper
2005). The German view was that cultural change was an outcome of the mixture of peoples. William H.R.
Rivers refined this programme arguing that the only consistent evidence of intermixture of peoples was
what he called ‘social  structure’,  e.g.  marriage rules,  whereas elements of  material  culture could be
adopted informally. Therefore, studies of social structure afforded the most reliable data of migration and
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diffusion. Based on a range of empirical material and theorising, Rivers argued that patrilineal succession
and chieftainship in Melanesian society, for example, were the outcome of immigrant influences on what
was a previous evolutionary stage of society. Rivers’ interest in diffusion enabled him to account as well for
evolution (1922).
These evolutionary ideas in anthropology were subject to critique from within mainstream history at the
time. Notable here is the historian Frederic Maitland who was critical of the evolutionary ideas influencing
anthropology,  as  there  was  no  empirical  evidence  that  such  different  evolutionary  ‘stages’  in  social
development actually existed. For example,  supposed ‘laws’ were established by the above-mentioned
group of anthropologists advocating that the original form of society was based on matriarchal principles
which then ‘evolved’ to one based on patriarchal principles. However, systematic evidence for matriarchal
roots in patriarchal societies could not be found.
At the same time, Maitland argued that anthropology had to become more like history in the sense of
avoiding generalisations, examining each case carefully because local circumstances are almost certainly
crucial, and abandoning the belief in preconceived universal laws of progress. He famously wrote: ‘My own
belief is that by and by anthropology will  have the choice between being history and being nothing’
(Maitland 1911:  295).  Maitland was a  central  figure in  the professionalisation of  history  in  England
(Goldstein 1990). He was a ‘master of detail’ who swept aside the futile dream of writing a single, universal
history (Collingwood 1961 [1946]: 127). Maitland’s remark about anthropology and history has been cited
by  numerous  anthropologists  over  the  decades  to  emphasise  the  close  relation  between  the  two
disciplines.
[1]
The conception of history Maitland espoused is called ‘historicism’: ‘the idea that to understand anything it
has to be seen both as a unity and in its historical development’ (Chakrabarty 2008: 6; cf. Mandelbaum
1971: 42). As Charles Stewart notes, the logic of historicism is that ‘current happenings may be seen as
outcomes of  prior  events  and present  events  as  belonging to  the  past  as  time flows on’  (2012:  1).
Historicism also insists that the past must be understood in its own terms; it has become a key term in
modern historiography.
[2]
During the first half of the twentieth century, a new generation of anthropologists in Britain soon viewed
ideas of evolution and diffusion as ‘pseudo-history’. In particular, the ‘founding fathers’ of modern British
social anthropology, Bronislaw Malinowski and Alfred Radcliffe-Brown, in their different ways found the
ideas of the previous generation of anthropologists misleading. Although neither ever explicitly mentioned
Maitland, the direction they took anthropology inevitably turned its back on the old form of history applied
by their predecessors while practicing and advocating a form of anthropology more in line with Maitland’s
emphasis on detailed empirical research.
Eric Hirsch. History. CEA   4
This text is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.
For image use please see separate credit(s). ISSN 2398-516X
Both Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown were opposed to the conjectural kind of history previously conducted
because the evidence supporting either evolution or diffusion, as noted above, did not exist. For example,
although life expectancy in many societies may increase over time with better provision of health care and
improved  nutrition  this  does  not  mean  that  societies  necessarily  progress  through  fixed  stages  of
evolutionary or even economic progress (cf. Rostow 1960). What mattered, according to Malinowski and
Radcliffe-Brown, was not the past and what might have happened then, but the present; how societies
‘functioned’—how they made living together achievable—and, in Radcliffe-Brown’s case, the structure of
that functioning.
American  anthropology  around  this  same  time  was  debating  the  extent  to  which  its  practice  of
anthropology was itself a form of history. Franz Boas, the ‘founding father’ of American anthropology, was
critical of evolutionism, yet he saw anthropology as fundamentally a historical science, one ‘which centres
in the attempt to understand the individual phenomena rather than in the establishment of general laws’
(1932:  612).  Boas’  historical  analysis  operated  on  a  very  limited  scale,  making  cautious  historical
reconstructions, similar to ‘microhistory’, in that they captured the fleeting moment (see Faubion 1993:
38). This was a form of history in line with what Maitland advocated, although again, Boas never referred
to  him  directly.  Whether  such  microhistory  can  be  related  more  easily  to  the  past  than  can  the
‘macrohistory’ of evolutionism and diffusionism has remained a topic of debate (see Lévi-Strauss 1963
[1958]: 9).
Boas’s protégé Alfred Kroeber placed more emphasis on historical reconstruction using archaeological data
to establish what cultures may have existed. As an example of this, he cites the case of ‘pottery figurines
which are found from western Mexico to Venezuela and Peru and from which as principal evidence there
has been reconstructed an Archaic Middle American horizon or type of culture’ (Kroeber 1931: 151). He
suggests that the demonstration of these figurines at several locations given their resemblances provides
‘evidence of the spread of a common culture, in spite of local variations’. Kroeber criticised Boas for not
developing temporal sequences to the historical issues he encountered in his research or trying to infer or
reconstruct the past of a culture (1966: 109). For his part, Boas argued he was not adverse to historical
reconstruction but the reconstruction had to be cautious, avoiding sweeping generalisations.
[3]
 It was also
observed that although Boas acknowledged that the dynamics of a society or culture were the result of
historical processes, he did not hold that these dynamics were fully determined by their history. Rather,
like Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown, Boas saw it was crucial to understand the functioning of a society or
culture aside from its history (Hoernlé 1985 [1933]: 9).
These varied historical approaches were assessed by Claude Lévi-Strauss (1963 [1958]). He reiterated the
conjectural nature of evolutionist and diffusionist studies and even included here the work of Kroeber,
among others, with their ‘more modest and rigorous studies… of the distribution of certain cultural traits in
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limited areas’ (Lévi-Strauss 1963 [1958]: 6). Lévi-Strauss argued that reconstructions of the past were
plausible, but also deceptive. For example, the existence of an Archaic Middle American culture mentioned
above remains highly contested until today. Lévi-Strauss also emphasised that reconstructions of the past
tell the reader nothing about the conscious or unconscious processes of the actual people who acquired
certain  institutions.  Were  they  invented,  a  modification  of  previous  institutions,  or  borrowed  from
elsewhere (Lévi-Strauss 1963 [1958]: 6)? To support this point, Lévi-Strauss considered the example of
dual organisation, a type of social structure often found in America, Asia, and Oceania. It is characterised
by the division of the social group into two halves or ‘moieties’ whose corresponding members have a
variety of relations ranging from the intimate to the hostile. He rules out evolutionist and diffusionist
interpretations of their existence for the reasons mentioned above. According to Lévi-Strauss, it is clear
that historical factors account in part for dual organisation in any social context, yet this history might not
be  available  to  the  ethnographer  studying  the  particular  society,  and  its  exact  importance  for  the
institutions in question is hard to determine. Dilemmas of this sort—how to account for the existence of a
particular institution or practice—are faced by all anthropologists (Lévi-Strauss 1963 [1958]: 10).
History and anthropology as ‘inseparable’
Nonetheless, Lévi-Strauss argues that history and ethnography are closely allied—‘inseparable’—as they
share a concern with societies other than the one we currently inhabit (1963 [1958]: 23). The otherness
may be in time (history), however small, or remoteness in space, regardless of how distant (ethnography).
Both seek to ‘reconstruct’—through historical causation and narrative or through ethnographic description
and interpretation—what has or is happening in the society being studied (Lévi-Strauss 1963 [1958]: 16).
Lévi-Strauss quotes the famous statement by Marx: ‘[People] make their own history, but they do not know
that they are making it’ (1963 [1958]: 23). This justifies, Lévi-Strauss observes, ‘first, history and, second
anthropology’.
A similar point is made by Edward Evans-Pritchard. For all  the supposed disregard of history by his
anthropology colleagues (see below), Evans-Pritchard asks whether social anthropology is not ‘itself a kind
of historiography’ (1962: 22). The parallel between disciplines exists in the forms of research and how this
is then transmitted: the anthropologist ‘seeks to understand the significant overt features of a culture and
to translate them into terms of [her/his] culture’ after living with the people for an extended period of time
(Evans-Pritchard 1962:  23).  The historian,  he suggests,  ‘lives’  in  his  archives  and documents  for  an
extended period of time and seeks to accomplish the same kind of translation. Both are equally selective in
the material they choose to use. In making this argument, Evans-Pritchard invokes Maitland’s dictum cited
above and he develops themes also present in the work of Lévi-Strauss. Evans-Pritchard does mention
some work among British anthropologists that adopt a historical perspective, such as John Barnes (1951)
and Ian Cunnison (1951). Among these should also be included his own history of the Sanusiya Order, an
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order of Sufis who are Sunni or Orthodox Muslims (Evans-Pritchard 1949). His book focuses on the Sanusi
of Cyrenaica, the eastern coastal region of Libya. He gained a familiarity with the region, its Bedouin
people, and the Order during the Second World War when he was posted there as part of his military
service. Given this, it was not possible for him to carry out systematic studies of an anthropological kind,
but his close contact with the Bedouin enabled him to read the literature that forms the basis of his study
(Evans-Pritchard 1949: 7).
On  the  whole,  Evans-Pritchard  is  critical  of  the  lack  of  attention  to  historical  matters  by  his
contemporaries. He argues that historical awareness is vital for satisfactory understanding in a particular
field or in general: ‘… those who ignore history condemn themselves to not knowing the present, because
historical development alone permits us to weigh and to evaluate in their respective relations the elements
of the present’ (Evans-Pritchard 1962: 56). This is an explicitly Western view of history’s significance and
one not necessarily shared cross-culturally, an issue returned to later.
Evans-Pritchard’s critique of conventional anthropological practice and what he saw as its lack of interest
in  history  was  itself  subjected  to  critique  (see  Smith  1962).  The  question  was  raised  of  ‘[w]hether
anthropologists should be historians’ (Schapera 1962). This question suggests that a distinction needs to be
made between the social present, which the anthropologist studies, and the social past, which is the
interest of the historian. The anthropologist’s research is conducted in the social present, but in order to
understand that present, the anthropologist may need to consider the social past, conventionally studied by
the historian (Schapera 1962: 145). It is noted that Evans-Pritchard’s (1949) own historically-oriented book
on the Sanusi is not based on anthropological research conducted while he was resident in Cyrenaica.
Rather, it is a study of the origins and development of that Order. What would Evans-Pritchard have said
about the Order’s social past had he written instead a study of its social present (Schapera 1962: 152)?
The more general point to be taken from this debate includes the insight that the relevance of history and
the sort of history deployed depend on the kinds of problems being examined (Schapera 1962: 152). Many
of the anthropologists that worked in Southern Africa, for example, who were trained by Malinowski and
Radcliffe-Brown, studied people that were heavily influenced by European colonialism (e.g. Hunter 1936).
The historical changes that resulted could not be ignored and anthropologists considered in their analyses
when, how, and why historic change had occurred (Schapera 1962: 145). These anthropologists, then,
situated their ethnographies in a social context shaped by the history of colonialism.
Some years before Evans-Pritchard’s critique, Edmund Leach also addressed a tension in Evans-Pritchard’s
writings  between  a  focus  on  the  present  purposes  and  social  relationships  between  people  (viz.  a
‘functionalist social equilibrium’), such as his book The Nuer (1940) and Evans-Pritchard’s advocacy for the
use  of  history.  How  could  the  inconsistencies  between  these  two  positions  be  resolved?  Leach’s
ethnography Political systems of Highland Burma (1954) provided an answer. He argued that explaining
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political life with reference to a social equilibrium, as proposed by scholars focusing on the purposes of
social action known as ‘functionalists’, was an ‘as if’ description. It is ‘as if’ because it relates to ideal
models rather than real societies; ideal models created and held in unique ways by both the people under
study and the anthropologist. In the case of the Kachin people of Leach’s study, there were three relevant
political forms: an egalitarian form of political life referred to as ‘gumlao’, a chiefly or hierarchical form
known as ‘gumsa’ form - a form that seeks to imitate, when the opportunity arises, the neighbouring Shan
state on the horizon. These political forms were in recurrent transformation, and Leach draws on historical
documentation to describe this over an extended time period. His book seeks to ‘present a convincing
model of what happens over time when such functionalist or “as if” systems interact’ (Leach 1954: 285).
Like Lévi-Strauss, Leach also shows how history and ethnography are thus inseparable, but via a different
route to that outlined by Lévi-Strauss (Lévi-Strauss 1963 [1958]: 18; cf. Comaroff & Comaroff 1992: 22-3).
Diverse ways of understanding and experiencing history
Although several of the anthropologists cited by Isaac Schapera (1962) considered the historical changes
introduced by European influence in Southern Africa societies, colonialism as a specific historical form was
not itself analysed. Talal Asad, writing in the early 1970s, notes the ‘strange reluctance’ most professional
anthropologists have in sincerely considering ‘the power structure within which their discipline has taken
shape’ (1973: 15). He highlights the unequal power relation between Western societies and those societies
conventionally studied by anthropology, an encounter which goes back to the ‘emergence of bourgeois
Europe’ and of which ‘colonialism is merely one historical moment’ (Asad 1973: 16).
One form of history that was trying to address this shortcoming is ‘ethnohistory’. Its creation is bound up
with the particular nature of settler colonialism in the United States and the establishment of the Indian
Claims  Commission,  which  served  as  an  arbiter  between  Native  American  groups  and  the  federal
government  between  1946  and  1978.  Ethnohistory’s  origins  were  in  the  law  courts  to  adjudicate
indigenous land rights. It was necessary to decide what constituted an ‘identifiable group’ and to establish
historical continuity between such groups that had signed treaties decades before that of present activists.
Particular contemporary Native American peoples had to make the case that they had not ‘changed’ in
order to be successful in court,  so paradoxically they had to exist ‘outside of history’ in order to be
identified as groups that could demonstrate their historical continuity. Ethnohistorians were thus left with
the task of mediating between different notions of ‘history’—Native American and Euro-American (Harkin
2010: 116-8). In very general terms, some of the difference hinges on the idea of the past as a living
ancestral presence (Native American) as found in the landscape and the moral power of ancestral place
names  (see  Basso  1996),  and  one  where  the  past  (history)  is  dead  and  gone  (Euro-American).
Archaeologists,  for example,  continue to speak of ‘prehistory’  for any Native American people before
European contact, denying history and historical agency to Native American peoples prior to the arrival of
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Europeans.
In addition,  beginning in the early twentieth century,  anthropologists  argued that no value could be
attached to Native American oral traditions as their ‘truth value’ was uncertain (see Lowie 1915). Thus,
Native Americans were denied a form of  historical  awareness which,  in turn,  became the focus and
principle of ethnohistorical method by mid-century (Harkin 2010: 119). The emergence of ethnohistory also
called attention more forcefully to the existence of colonial power relations and their effects on native
peoples, as well as a re-evaluation of the importance of oral traditions (see Cohn 1987; Vansina 1965).
American anthropologists, like their British counterparts, began to evaluate the wider ramifications of
colonialism and anthropological inquiry. The ‘colonial situation’ was not viewed as ‘impact’ or ‘culture
contact’ but one in which the ‘the European colonist [whether traders, missionaries or administrators] and
the  indigene  are  united  in  one  analytic  field’  (Cohn 1987:  44).  The  anthropologist  deploys  such  an
analytical field to show how indigenous peoples become incorporated into diverse colonial and capitalist
relations of power and expropriation (cf. Kaplan 1995: 208; Stoler 2002: 105). To ignore this situation ‘is to
trivialise the experiences of the natives’ (Cohn 1987: 44; see Wiener 1995: 11; cf. Geertz 1980). Certainly
by the 1980s an historical perspective is foregrounded in much anthropological inquiry, no more so than in
Eric  Wolf’s  groundbreaking book Europe and the people  without  history  (1982).  Adopting a  Marxist
framework, he describes how the history of European colonial expansion to all corners of the globe since
the late  fifteenth century,  in  search of  wealth  as  well  as  the  production and trade of  commodities,
simultaneously shaped the histories of diverse native peoples (cf. Sahlins 1988; Wallerstein 1974). The
explicit global perspective at the core of the book highlights the intricate connections created by capitalist
and  indigenous  modes  of  production  and  eschews  a  focus  on  self-contained  societies  and  cultures
unaffected by wider political and economic forces. For example, in one chapter of the book, Wolf shows
how the commercial routes of the fur trade stretched across most of what is now Canada and the northern
United States, incorporating numerous Native American peoples (e.g. Cree, Ojibwa, etc.) who supplied the
furs valued by Europeans and which transformed, in turn, these societies. The book’s title is ironic: ‘[t]here
are thus… no people without history, no peoples – to use Lévi-Strauss’s phrase – whose histories have
remained “cold”’ (Wolf 1982: 385).
Wolf’s reference to Lévi-Strauss’s (1978 [1973]) distinction between ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ societies has been
generally misunderstood (cf. Bloch 1998: 109). Lévi-Strauss does not suggest that some societies have
history while others do not. Rather, the distinction between ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ was used as a metaphor to
express different relations with historical change. ‘Cold societies’ seek to annul the effects of historical
influences through their social institutions, thus sustaining a stable continuity; ‘hot societies’, by contrast,
embrace historical change and perceive its effects as the basis of societal development (Lévi-Strauss 1966
[1962]: 234; 1990 [1971]: 607; Gow 2001: 310-2). The Western ideology of progress is, for example, a
potent expression of this ‘hotness’ (cf. Löwith 1949).
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The distinction between the synchronic and diachronic study of people’s lives has been similarly commonly
misinterpreted. Radcliffe-Brown first introduced these terms into anthropology (see Schapera 1962: 144;
cf. Evans-Pritchard 1962: 61). For him, a synchronic description refers to an account of a ‘form of social
life’ (a particular collection of human beings) at a specific time that abstracts from that social context its
empirically ‘enduring characteristics’ (e.g. rules of marriage). Diachronic, by contrast, is an account of the
‘systematic change’ that has occurred to the form of social life over a period (Radcliffe-Brown 1952: 4;
Barnes 1971: 542). Lévi-Strauss’s use of these terms is different. Synchronic, for Lévi-Strauss, concerns the
‘principle of regularity’, e.g. that a spoken language at any moment in time has an orderliness that allows it
to be understood and communicated.  By contrast,  diachronic is  the accidental  and particular.  Again,
drawing on the example of language, languages continually change due to unintentional circumstances,
such as new expressions being introduced, and the individual ways a language is expressed. Lévi-Strauss’s
use of these terms derives from the linguist Ferdinand de Saussure: synchrony is like langue (collective
language),  diachrony  is  like  parole  (individual  speech)—analogous  to  stable  continuity  and  historical
contingency.
Lévi-Strauss deploys synchronic and diachronic analysis  in his  monumental  set  of  volumes known as
Mythologiques (1964-1971). The study of myth he undertakes appears to be the opposite of an interest in
history, as there are no dates or chronology. However, myths exist because of history—in a comparable way
that language (langue) exists because of speech (parole) (and vice versa) (see Gow 2001: 11). Myths
‘generate the appearance of stability, an illusion of timelessness that cannot be affected by changes in the
world, but they do so by means of their ceaseless transformation’ (Gow 2001: 11). In order to sustain a
coherence of meaningfulness in social life, myths transform in response to a variety of historical events and
it is these subtle changes in myth that make it appear as if there has been no change. It is the analysis of
these transformations, moving from one people to the next over two continents, which enabled Lévi-Strauss
to examine a complex historical phenomenon, i.e. the past peopling of the Americas. This is a process that
occurred in historical time where no archival documents are available but where archaeology and historical
linguistics provides evidence to support Lévi-Strauss’s analysis (see Lévi-Strauss 1990 [1971]).
Marshall  Sahlins  (1981;  1985)  sought  to  historicise  Lévi-Strauss’  structuralism (i.e.  his  study  of  the
structure of human thought and social organisation) by showing how cultural structures order history (in
particular  historic  events)  and  conversely.  His  well-known studies  of  Captain  Cook’s  sojourn  among
Hawaiians are an illustration. In that example, Sahlins focuses on the dichotomy between ‘the contingency
of events [Cook’s appearance among Hawaiians] and the recurrence of structures [Hawaiian culture]’
(1985:  xiii).  Structures are understood to coordinate events.  In  other words,  ‘[c]ulture is  historically
grounded, its constructs (metaphors [historical metaphors]) embodied in events and occasions, but practice
has its own dynamics, and what really takes place generates novel myths [mythical realities]’ (Strathern
1996: 124). In order to understand the killing of Cook by Hawaiians, Sahlins argues this event needs to be
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seen in relation to a previous set of events which precipitated Cook’s demise. The first event is the
Makahiki festival and the second is Cook’s return to the island not long after departing following the
festival. In the Makahiki, a cosmological drama about political appropriation unfolds. The fertility of the
land is renewed and reclaimed by the lost god-chief Lono. But this is supplanted by the ruling chief and the
chief’s sacrificial cult of Ku. Cook’s visit to the Islands corresponded with the festival and the return of
Lono. The treatment he received from Hawaiians matched the fixed order of ritual events in the Makahiki
(Sahlins 1981: 17).
Lono and Ku were rivals for Hawaiian power. When Cook departed after his second visit, it meant his work
of  fertility  renewal  was done.  Unfortunately,  not  long after  departing,  one of  Cook’s  ships sprung a
foremast and the vessels had to return to Hawaii. Cook as Lono was now perceived as a threat to chiefly
power. The subsequent killing of Cook, Sahlins argues, was not premeditated by the Hawaiians; neither
was it an accident. He suggests it ‘was the Makahiki in an historical form’ (Sahlins 1981: 24). In other
words,  according to  Sahlins,  the  cultural  structure (Makahiki  festival)  orders  events  (Cook’s  killing).
Sahlins’ description of an historic event attempts to reproduce for Europeans (Cook and his crew) and
anthropologists what is also attributed to the Hawaiians. Yet is this how the Hawaiians perceived the
‘events’? Would they have been registered as events in such a historical scheme (Strathern 1990)? Or,
rather were the ‘events’ registered as ‘performances, in the images they strive to convey, and thereby in
how they present the effects of social action to themselves’ (Strathern 1990: 28, emphasis removed; cf.
Lederman 1986; Neumann 1992)? What Sahlins’ analysis does is not so much historicise structure as show
how a unique series of events are amenable to structuralist analysis. In doing so, the events are explained
by being put into their historical context—a chronology is created, in the sense that they are embedded in
Western historical time.
Out of time
An  interest  in  bringing  societies  into  history  and  historical  time  is  connected  with  what  has  been
characterised as the problem of ‘coevalness’. This is the problem that the people studied by anthropology
are often placed in another time, that of the ‘ethnographic present’ (Fabian 1983: 31). Synchronic forms of
analysis  potentially  place  the  object  of  anthropological  study  in  a  time  different  from  the
anthropologists—such approaches are atemporal, anthropologist and native are not coeval, not in the same
time. The issue of coevalness is also connected to the absence of historical time in some anthropological
accounts whereby a society is represented as if unaffected by substantial historical change. From this
standpoint a consideration of history does not have an essential influence on the social life being studied
(see Thomas 1996: 5).
A  range of  studies  that  responded to  these concerns  and incorporated a  historical  time perspective
appeared from the 1980s onwards (see Cole 2001; Ohnuki-Tierney 1987; Ortner 1989; Parmentier 1987;
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Price 1983, 1990, among numerous others). Notable among these is Jean Comaroff’s (1985) historical study
of power and resistance among the Tshidi of South Africa. Over a period of one hundred and fifty years,
their local independent chiefdom became a rural periphery within the South African state. For over eighty
years  they  were  part  of  a  poorly  paid  labour  market  but  still  dependent  on  their  own agricultural
production. The Tshidi have also been subject to Christian missionisation starting one century and a half
earlier. Comaroff’s study traces the interchange of Protestantism and proletarianisation which crystallised
the Tshidi’s  consciousness of  inequality  and constituted the basis  for  challenging and resisting their
subordination.  The  forces  of  state  power  made  explicit  political  expression  difficult,  however,  ‘the
submission to  authority  celebrated by the Christian faith  was transformed into  a  biblically  validated
defiance’ (Comaroff 1985: 2). Such defiance was concealed and coded, and Comaroff’s study discloses its
logic and enduring historical significance.
David Sutton’s (1998) study of indigenous notions of history on the Greek island of Kalymnos also responds
to the above concerns about history and coevalness. It explores the myriad ways the past forms part of how
the island denizens interpret the present—how the past is thus active and alive in the present. It reveals a
distinct form of historical consciousness. Sutton shows, for example, how at local level the indigenous word
for ‘histories’ translates as disputes, quarrels and acts of shame, such as stealing or sexual infidelities, that
disrupt the conventional pattern of social life. For a person or family to ‘have history’ indicates they have a
‘stained’  name due  to  past  misconduct  of  a  sexual,  social,  or  financial  nature.  Sutton  reveals  such
histories—as disruptive events—operate as well at national level, as in the collaboration with the Italian
Occupation of the island.
In Mahajanga, Madagascar, the idea of ‘bearing’ history is the focus of Michael Lambek’s (2002) study.
Bearing here is a kind of embodied history that takes the form of spirit possessions. The spirits that possess
the Mahajanga’s mediums happen in the medium’s houses throughout the area and in the course of their
possession a juxtaposition of  distinct  historical  epochs occurs.  As the spirits  that  possess and speak
through the mediums are usually ancestral members of the royal clan, Lambek argues that spirit mediums
sanctify the present through the ancestral past. Conventionally, only royals were entitled to history in this
island context, but over time this history has become more widely disseminated through the mediums that
bear and articulate it. The mediums live in and with history and Lambek’s study focuses on the multiple
dimensions of this bearing, including the ethical activity and power relations that such bearing implies (cf.
Lambek 2018).
Often, the intention of the authors is to describe the ‘making of history’ by the people so described. They
draw attention to human capacity to intervene in it, as ‘history is not simply something that happens to
people, but something they make’ (Ortner 1984: 159). In contrast to Wolf’s (1982) historical account, where
the focus is on a global system in the making over centuries and its local effects, the emphasis of writers
such as Sherry Ortner is on the historical agency or practice of local peoples. The historian Reinhart
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Koselleck has noted that the very idea of ‘making history’ is historical and could not have been formulated
before  Napoleon  and  certainly  not  before  the  French  Revolution:  ‘[O]nly  since  around  1780  was  it
conceivable that  [history]  could be made’  (2004 [1979]:  193-4).  It  is  both a  modern experience and
expectation ‘that one is increasingly capable of planning and also executing history’. Clearly, people have
always planned what they do. However, to plan explicitly to ‘make history’ is an idea that was possible to
articulate at a distinct time and place. Only in the late eighteenth century was one able to talk of history in
general or history in and for itself—history as an ‘objectless singular’. Previously histories had existed in
the plural, and history as an expression was plural (e.g. the history of England, the history of religion, etc.).
When anthropologists speak of people ‘making history’,  even metaphorically,  it  raises the problem of
attributing to people a capacity and outlook that is distinctly Western and one of fairly recent origin. An
interest in viewing actors as active no doubt arises from the perceived menace of potentially homogenising
world capitalism, colonialism, and post-colonialism, and writers such as Ortner and Sahlins have sought to
demonstrate this has not been the case. Asad suggests this is ‘prima facie a reasonable claim, although it
does not tell us whether, and if so how, local peoples make their own history’ (1993: 7).
The flipside of the problem of coevalness is the issue of ‘homochronism’: ‘a displacement of those people
who  are  ethnographically  represented  out  of  their  temporality  and  their  assimilation  into  academic
discourses of  history’  (Birth 2008: 7).  In other words,  it  is  the problem of establishing a single,  all-
embracing set of time-based tropes. This makes sense if we are wedded to a linear conception of time with
a clear distinction between past and present. However, it does not apply if a peoples’ understanding of the
past and its relation to the present are different than Western ideas of history. Michael Taussig (1980)
provides an instance of this potential problem. His work focuses on mining and plantation labour in South
America, connecting folk ideas of the devil with Marxist notions of class consciousness. When Taussig
discusses the sugar plantations in western Columbia, his narrative is marked by dates and periods to
record the relations between Africans, Indians, and Europeans. Contrasting his account with that of Joanne
Rappaport’s (1990) discussion of the construction of history and time among the Páez in Columbia (Taussig
1980: 42-45),  the question arises whether Taussig might be imposing his temporal and chronological
sensibilities on his ethnographic subjects (Birth 2008: 10). This issue raises the possibility that a particular
conception of history and its representation of time are perceived as privileged forms of understanding that
anthropologist might be too readily prostrating to.
Questioning history; the significance of historicity
In a debate with Jean Paul Sartre, Lévi-Strauss (1966 [1962]: 245-69) famously questioned the superiority
attributed to historical knowledge. He claimed that historical knowledge was partial in the sense of having
a bias even if it declares not to be. He uses the example of the French Revolution. Writing a history of such
an event cannot both be a revolutionary Jacobin account and an aristocratic account. It will always remain
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incomplete and subjective (Lévi-Strauss 1966 [1962]: 257-8). This is true to a greater or lesser degree of all
history, whether ‘good’ or ‘bad’ history.
The assumed coherency of history that Western historical thought considers as its focus of study is in fact,
Lévi-Strauss suggests, the ‘coherency of myth’ (Lévi-Strauss 1966 [1962]: 245-69; 1984 [1964]: 12-3; White
1978: 103). History, seen from this perspective, is the equivalent of ‘myth with dates’ (Barnes 1971: 547).
The coherency of  myth is  created when ‘basic  story units  (or  clusters  of  events)’  are arranged into
narratives in such a manner that an essentially human structure or process may appear as a natural
inevitability’ (White 1978: 103). When a historian or anthropologist gives an account of ‘why something
happened’, they make a claim to fact, which actually rests on a set of conventions for the construction of a
plausible  narrative.  All  such  historical  stories,  then,  take  part  in  the  mythical  realm  because  they
‘cosmologise’ or ‘naturalise’ that which are nothing but human constructions; they could be other than how
they are structured (White 1978: 103).
Historical narratives, as much as mythic narratives, then, constitute particular modes of experiencing time.
Nancy Munn draws on the notion of  temporalisation to  describe the manifold way relations in  time
transpire. Actors are not only ‘in’ a particular time. They are simultaneously constructing that time and
their own experience of that time in the kind of relations formed between themselves and a given set of
temporal orientation points. Munn suggests this is a symbolic process that assumes multiple forms ‘all the
time’, with time-reckoning being only one form of temporalisation. It entails both implicit knowing as well
as explicit attention to the time element in the course of the projects performed by actors (1992: 104; cf.
Fabian  1983:  74).  More  generally,  the  past-present-future  relation  is  inherent  in  all  forms  of
temporalisation. This is because ‘people operate in a present that is always infused and which they are
further infusing with pasts and futures’ (Munn 1992: 115; Gell 1992: 238-9). Although we all live in one
single time, how those past-present-future relations are represented in any social context can never be
known, except through careful study.
For example, among the Cumbal Indians of Columbia, reference to a past action is made by saying adelante
(‘forward’ in time or in space). Cumbales explain this usage by arguing that ‘although events occurred in
the past, we live their consequences today and must act upon them now. For this reason, what already
occurred is in front of the observer, because that is where it can be corrected’ (Rappaport 1988: 721). In a
similar way, the New Zealand Maoris refer to the past as nga ra o mua, ‘the days in front’ and the future as
kei muri, ‘behind’. The use of these terms is explained as follows: ‘They move into the future with their eyes
on the past. In deciding how to act in the present, they examine the panorama of [the past] spread before
their eyes, and select the model that is most appropriate …from the many presented there’. It would be
mistaken to see the Maori living in the past. Rather, the past is drawn on for guidance—the past is brought
into both present and future (Metge 1976: 70).
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In referring to these representations of time as ‘history’,  their distinctiveness is obscured, potentially
reducing them to the Western concept of history, where the writing of history known as historicism defines
how the past should be studied. Historicism insists that the past must be understood on its own terms (see
Palmié 2013). For many Western people, it makes perfect sense to say ‘the past is dead, you cannot change
the past’. It is because it is dead that the past can be an object of historical study (Dening 1991). In a
similar fashion, the idea of the past as a ‘foreign country’ (Lowenthal 1985) also has resonance for many
Westerners. In a literal way, the subject of history ‘invades’ that country, subjects its denizens to this
discipline, and appropriates their countries to the present (see Fasolt 2004: xviii). But these ideas do not
necessarily apply across societies.
Such  a  complaint  was  levelled  against  ethnohistory  (see  Krech  1991).  As  traditionally  practiced,
ethnohistory has meant the reconstruction of the history of a people that had in the past no written history.
Others disagreed with this convention: ‘[E]thnohistory … must fundamentally consider the people’s own
sense of  how events are constituted,  and their  ways of  culturally  constructing the past’  (Gewertz &
Schieffelin 1985: 3). Similar criticisms were levelled against the formal principles used for assessing the
truth value of oral traditions (Vansina 1965) as if they were written archival documents (Rosaldo 1980a; cf.
Rosaldo 1980b).
These critiques suggest radically questioning the nature of history and by implication that of historical
time. The historian Dipesh Chakrabarty has advocated a shift away from two ontological assumptions that
inform ‘secular conceptions of the political and the social’ (2008 [2000]: 15-6). One is that people exist in a
‘single and secular historical time’ that encompasses other sorts of time (cf. Bear 2014: 5-6). The second is
that people are ontologically singular. Entities such as gods or spirits can be represented as ‘beliefs’ but
cannot be ascribed any real agency in historical events (cf. Sahlins 2017). The problem is one of moving
beyond Eurocentric histories and the naturalism of historical time associated with the idea that ‘everything
can be historicised’ (Chakrabarty 2008 [2000]: 73, emphasis removed; cf. Hastrup 1992: 11).
Consider the Indian Santal rebellion of 1855. The leaders of the rebellion said they carried out their actions
as ordered by their god Thakur. Such ideas can be acknowledged, but to attribute any actual agency to the
god in the events that transpired would go against standard historical procedures for resolving debates
about the past and the kinds of evidence that can be used (Chakrabarty 2008 [2000]: 104). A comparable
example is found among the Kaluli people, Papua New Guinea who contend that, years ago but within living
memory, forest animals emerged in large numbers to attack a Kaluli longhouse (Schieffelin 1985). It was a
form of revenge. The cause of such an attack was disrespect shown to animals, an event known as sana
mono (‘strike’ ‘eat’). Accounts from Kaluli people whose longhouses have been attacked in this way are
described in detail and it is shown how the attacks have a reality based on Kaluli perceptions of such
events (Schieffelin 1985: 44-5). However, Western historians would not accept the sana mono as a real
event ‘because they do not accept the Kaluli epistemological framework which gives the events in question
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their “meaning”’ (Schieffelin 1985: 54). Echoing Chakrabarty’s analysis, sana mono highlights the limits of
credibility in Western historical consciousness and ways of knowing (Schieffelin 1985: 54).
There is thus no third voice or perspective that can integrate the views of the Santal or Kaluli with that of
Eurocentric history. Each has distinct ideas of causality and of the relations between past, present and
future. How can this problem of analysis be resolved? Anthropologists and historians have been moving in
the same direction in this regard (see Ballard 2014). The historian François Hartog (2015 [2003]) has
proposed the notion of ‘regimes of historicity’ to solve this problem. These regimes are analytic constructs
that refer to how individuals and groups situate themselves in time, and how they consider themselves to
alter over time (cf. Trouillot 1995: 3-4).
As individuals always have degrees of separation and relations from their selves as well as others, it is
through the categories of past, present, and future that order and meaning is provided to these forms of
division and connection, enabling them to be understood and articulated (Hartog 2015 [2003]: xvi). For
example, a Dinka man (in what is now South Sudan) had been imprisoned in Khartoum. In response to this
past event, he called one of his children Khartoum in memory of that place and to exorcise the powerful
agency that troubling place from the past could have over him in the present and future. This Dinka man’s
historicity was bound up with Khartoum in a way not captured by viewing his past through the lens of
history (Lienhardt 1961: 149). It is thus possible to recognise historicity separately from the advent of the
modern concept of history and historicism.
The significance of historicity in this regard is that it does not assume that events or time exist as a line of
occurrences that add together as ‘history’. Whereas orthodox ideas of history (associated with historicism)
isolate the past, historicity emphases the multifaceted relationships of past, present, and future (see Hirsch
&  Stewart  2005;  Fazioli  2017:  16).  Thus,  different  peoples  will  have  distinct  ways  of  valuing  and
communicating these categories and their interconnections (see Argenti 2019). It is this that the analyst
might designate as a ‘regime’ or, alternatively, historicity may be understood as part of a cosmology or
worldview (Tonkin 1992: 68-70). In both cases, the issue of one of how people make sense and represent
their experiences of time.
For instance, what is especially novel in the New Testament is ‘the tension between the decisive “already
fulfilled” and the “not yet completed” between present and future’ (Hartog 2015 [2003]: 61). It is upon this
tension that a Christian order of time and cosmology was created as well as a Christian influenced history,
being a history of salvation (Cullman 1967: 172). To nineteenth century evangelical missionaries in Africa,
the Bible was of overriding central importance: ‘[i]t was their supreme paradigmatic history, through which
they recognised new situations and even their own actions’ (Peel 1995: 595-6). The missionaries did not
just see themselves, but that of the African ‘other’, in this cosmology and narratives of the Bible (cf.
Trautmann 1995: 176). Subsequently, a worldview based on ideas of progress supplanted the ‘striving for
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salvation’ and appropriated ‘the latter’s forward focused tension combined with a “hopeful expectation”
orientated toward the future’ (Löwith 1949: 47).  The native who did not pursue such a ‘progressive’
temporal trajectory could appear as living in another time, as lacking ‘modernity’, and a proper grasp of
history could be viewed as ‘history’s forgotten doubles’ (Nandy 1995). At the same time, it is evident that
the contemporary is  plural,  radically plural,  and diverse peoples live their lives according to distinct
historicities that highlight the conceptual limits of conventional historical practice, historical time, and thus
of historicism.
Conclusion
The professionalisation of anthropology occurred at the same time that historicism became established as
the leading paradigm of historical practice. An inescapable fact of the world we inhabit is that everything,
potentially, can be placed in a historical context (Nandy 1995: 45). This is the basis of the modern historical
consciousness, whereby the past is no longer present and is thus an object of study. But this is only one
way of  understanding the  past  and its  relation to  the  present  and future.  There  are  other  ways  of
conceiving ‘history’ and historical consciousness (see Stewart 2012; Hodges 2015).
The dictum ‘that anthropology must choose between being history and being nothing’ is today widely
accepted—at least insofar as certain contexts of study clearly require historical analysis to be understood.
The reverse may also be true, namely that ‘history must choose between being … anthropology or being
nothing’. Although the latter has to some extent occurred (e.g. see Hunt 1989), both anthropology and
history can perhaps transcend the supremacy of historicism. This would be by revealing other ways of
knowing the inextricable relations between past, present, and future, thereby eschewing the idea that
everything can be historicised, and the explicit and implicit power structures that historicism sustains (see
Chakrabarty 2008 [2000]; Fasolt 2004).
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[1] Among numerous citations, the following are a selection from the past and more recent, some of which are referred to in the
text below: Barnes 1971; Cohn 1987; Comaroff & Comaroff 1992; Evans-Pritchard 1962; Hastrup 1992; Radin 1933; Rivers 1922;
Stocking 2001; Varisco 2015; White 1957; cf. Axel 2002: 33.
[2] Georg Iggers (1995) discusses the origins and complex of meanings attributed to the term over the course of the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries.
[3] Matti Bunzl (1996) traces Boas’s cautious cultural historicism to the German anthropological tradition of Bastian and Ritter,
through Wilhelm and Alexander von Humboldt and ultimately to the Herdian ideal of the Volksgeist.
